Abstract-In this paper, we argue that the determining aspect of the 'Internet of Things' (IoT) is the accessibility of 'things' on the global Internet, as opposed to a simple interconnection of networked 'things'. We observe that most reported applications of the 'Internet of Things' would be more accurately described as 'Intranets of Things'. In large part due to understandable concerns about the security of. In the wider field of the Internet 'in the large', the open mining of the Web for information has become the mainstay of many genres of research. We give an example of how in one project the prospect of using IoT data in a similar way has been validated to an extent on the basis that data owners voluntarily made their data available. We suggest that there are two services that need to be provided in order for the generalized information mining that occurs on the Internet-at-large to occur in the Internet of Things. The first is a means of cataloguing available data, which is already being addressed by services such as HyperCAT. The second is an automatic rights management service (IoT-RM), which would manage the rights and permissions and allow data owners to determine in advance to whom their data should be released, for what purposes, subject to which restrictions (such as, for instance, anonymisation) and whether any remuneration should be involved. We make some concrete proposals about the form that such an IoT-RM should take.
INTRODUCTION
The term 'Internet of Things' was originally coined by Kevin Ashton of the MIT Auto-ID Center. Writing in RFID Journal [1] , he remembers first using the term in a presentation made to Proctor and Gamble. Explaining his motivation, he says:
If we had computers that knew everything there was to know about things-using data they gathered without any help from us-we would be able to track and count everything, and greatly reduce waste, loss and cost. We would know when things needed replacing, repairing or recalling, and whether they were fresh or past their best.
We need to empower computers with their own means of gathering information, so they can see, hear and smell the world for themselves, in all its random glory.
It's clear that the original conception had at its core the Internet, and furthermore, some developing idea that if this rich ecology of 'things' could be interconnected, great things would happen. This presentation took place in 1999. Since then, 16 years have passed and the Internet of Things has not progressed to the extent where computers can 'see, hear and smell the world for themselves'.
To a large extent, this is not a problem of technology. The computational power of sensor nodes and embedded systems in general increases year on year. The Internet is by far the cheapest method of interconnection for anyone operating a network of sensors and other computational resources, which has resulted in many such networks being connected to the ultimate user of the data by this means. Thus these devices are already ubiquitous on the internet. However rather than making up an 'Internet of Things' they are configured as a collection of 'Intranets of Things', with security measures in place expressly to ensure that the data they provide is not openly and generally available.
The purpose of this paper is to consider the organisational blocks on the achievement of a true 'Internet of Things' and then to propose an additional part of Internet of Things architectures, concerned with automatic rights management, which we argue will provide the technological underpinnings required to allow removal of these blocks. We start by reviewing some of the potential benefits of information mining in the Internet of Things. Subsequently we review the commonly expressed security concerns and the technological U.I.Okeke@wlv.ac.uk solutions proposed to address them. A specific example of the operation of collaborative data sharing and limited consensual data mining is examined, the RFID from Farm to Fork (RFID-F2F) project. The operation of this system depended on information mining, but the information providers were knowing participants and had provided this information on the open Internet just so that it could be mined. To date, much activity concerned with enabling 'thing' owners to make their data available on the Internet has been directed at solving the problems of discoverability with the provision of cataloguing services such as HyperCAT [2] , so in order to provide context for the requirements for rights management, these systems are discussed. From this and consideration of the RFID-F2F information owners concerns, and the project activity required to address them we develop a set of requirements for automatic rights management service on the Internet of Things (IoT-RTRM Again, what is clearly implied is the idea that the data from devices will be freely accessible on the Internet, and used sufficiently widely that this use could be a significant threat to personal liberties.
It seems likely that information mining on the Internet of Things will be a rich source of knowledge. The techniques of information mining can allow very powerful derivation from many kinds of data. This is the context within which Barnaghi et. al. discussed the need to develop a semantic layer for the Internet of Things [5] . They note that: The RFID from Farm to Fork project is discussed by Cuinas et. al. [6] . The aim of the project was to allow consumer visibility of the production history and handling conditions in the supply chain. Food manufacturers tracked their production process using a combination of AIDC and sensing technology. All of this information was formatted according to GS1 EPCIS (Electronic Product Code Information Services) concepts [7] , in most cases using the open source Fosstrack implementation of EPCIS Repository as well as Query and Capture clients. The EPCIS standard assigns uniform resource identifiers (URIs) to individual assets, which is a globally unique name including a uniform resource locator, which can be used to locate the 'location' of the information on the World Wide Web.
A consumer on purchasing a product scans a QR code, Datamatrix or NFC tag, which provides the URI of the product just bought. This is a serialized URI, which may identify the specific product, delivery or production batch, depending on the traceability requirements of the product manufacturer. The query proceeds as follows. First the URL in the product URI is used to access the EPCIS repository at that location, which returns the information available for that product, which might include production dates, temperature logs, other sensor data and URIs for the ingredients. In turn, the product databases corresponding to those URIs are accessed and the product history of the ingredients retrieved. Proceeding in this way, the traceability process in the supply chain provides the entire history of the product and all of its ingredients can be discovered, hence the project title 'from Farm to Fork'. The user interface to this information is a custom website for that product, which is generated in real time by an application called 'Identity Explorer', and thus is usable on any device (smart phone) which can run a web browser. If the device also includes a camera (to scan QR code or read a Datamatrix) or NFC reader, then it is able to display all the available product information on that product. Availability of that information depends on the willingness of its owner to make it available on the open Internet, where the Identity Explorer can find it. There are many reasons why commercial concerns, such as food manufacturers, might wish to keep their production information confidential. These include maintenance of trade secrets, a concern that data mining of this information might reveal information on their business that they do not want to release and a feeling that revealing information openly poses some kind of unidentified threat.
To counteract these concerns, it was necessary to provide the participants with some real business advantage that accrued from the release of the information. In the case of the food industry, which has been affected by a number of scares concerning the authenticity and origin of foodstuffs, that advantage was increased marketability of their product.
Having provided a business case for exposing the data, it was necessary to provide reassurance that only the data that the manufacturers wanted released was accessed in the EPCIS. The information had been sourced in a variety of ways. Some of the larger manufacturers involved already ran processes with full traceability. In this case, all that was necessary was to select the data required for consumer traceability and perform a translation to the required EPCIS formats if necessary. With some smaller manufacturers traceability and process tracking was done entirely with paper based systems which was handled by installing some economical AIDC and sensing systems, which interfaced directly to the EPCIS system.
We argue that the RFID from Farm to Fork system was part of the Internet of Things, in that AIDC and sensor data was available directly on the Internet and that it was an example of information mining, in that it involved the real-time assembly of information from many services, with that information gathering being performed automatically. However, as an information mining application it was atypical, relying on data from organisations which had agreed in advance to make a subset of their production data available for the specific purpose of providing traceability, working with the system designers to determine which data was to be revealed and uploading that data to specialized servers, rather than allowing their working databases to be mined.
This contrasts with more usual instances of data mining, where those performing the mining decide what they will do with the data, and devise strategies using search engines to trawl the Internet for suitable data. If there were not data owners making their datasets available on the open Web, such strategies simply would not work. We suggest therefore that if the value of information mining the Internet of Things is to be realised that the owners of the data to be mined must have a way to gain the same kind of confidence in the use of their data that those taking part in the RFID-F2F project did. This can be summarized as follows:
• They should be able to gain some benefit from the use of their data.
• They should have some control over who uses their data and for what purpose.
• It should be possible to maintain control of the data, for instance in some cases it may be necessary to anonymise data.
To this end, we propose that Internet of Things architectures need to be expanded to include a layer that specifically deals with these concerns, a digital rights management layer implemented as part of the Internet of Services that connects things and people.
III. SECURITY CONCERNS
Security applied to the Internet of Things is an active strand of research. In his study of research directions for the Internet of Things, Stankovich identifies security as a major concern [8] . The IoT was identified as being vulnerable due the physical accessibility to sensors, actuators and objects, and the openness of the system. However, the physical accessibility is a particular concern of 'things' in general, and not a matter of their connection to the Internet. Roman et. al, provide an overview of security concerns in the Internet of Things, covering concerns including classical data security, but also the issues of privacy and identity [9] . They note that: The question of identity and ownership of data was a key concern in the RFID-F2F project, but is rarely considered in great detail in the literature of IoT security and privacy. Roman, et. al., do however put some thought into this, particularly introducing the notion of 'identity shadowing', in which 'a user projects his virtual identity onto logical nodes'. From the point of view of this study, we would interpret that as proposing that the owner of the nodes is the owner of the data, and takes the rights and responsibilities for that data, which flow from that ownership. It is not legally a formal copyright situation, but may be to some extent covered under EU database rights [10] .
One way of classifying attacks is by the method of attack Kopetz [11] classified various security attacks that can be as:
• Malicious attack: Where an adversary inserts malicious code.
• Spoofing attack: the adversary masquerade as a legitimate user in order to gain unauthorized access to a system.
• Password attack: The password of the system is been guessed. There are two versions of this kind of attack. Dictionary attacks and brute force attacks.
• Cipher-Text attacks: The attacker assumes to have access to the cipher text and tries to deduce the plain text and possibly the encryption key from the cipher text.
• Denial of Service attacks: The attack tries to make a computer system unavailable to its users by jamming the network.
• Botnet attack; a set of infected networked nodes like thousands of PC's that are under the control of an attacker.
Given the exposure that has been given to this kind of concern, it is not surprising that many owners of device networks are concerned about the protection of their security. Taking this into account, in addition to the commercial concerns discussed above, it is understandable that there is considerable reluctance to make the data for networks of devices available on the open Internet.
IV. AUTOMATIC RIGHTS MANAGEMENT FOR THINGS
The deliverables of the EU Framework 7 project 'Internet of Things -Architecture' [12] produced a complete architectural framework for the Internet of Things. One of the major concerns addressed, given its own separate deliverable was 'Privacy and Security' [13] . In the executive summary, the importance of these matters is stressed:
Security is an important cornerstone for the Internet of Things (IoT). More specific, all common aspects of security must be regarded. With the huge amount of data created by IoTs, integrity of data and trust in the services offering the data is crucial. Further, to protect important data and user interests, confidentiality of data and privacy of users must be ensured. In addition to integrity and confidentiality, each request and response inside the IoT has to be authenticated in a proper and secure way.
The stress is on stopping unauthorised access, rather than finding means of providing the widest authorised access compatible with the need to address security and privacy.
In their motivation for the need for a semantic layer within the Internet of Things, Barnaghi et. al. [5] discuss the various functions that will be required to enable widespread use of information mining type functions on the Internet of Things, including semantics for interoperability, IoT data integration, IoT data abstraction and access, Resource/service search and discovery. This is beginning to acknowledge that discoverability is a major concern for an effective use of IoT. Consequently, in recent times there has been some interest in cataloguing services, such as HyperCAT [14] , which provide for discovering IoT resources. HyperCAT provides a means for resource owners to make their resources discoverable by listing them in an open catalogue. However, it does not address the motivation for having them discoverable. On the basis of our experience with RFID-F2F, we believe that resource owners will require the following reassurances:
1. That they will receive some benefit for making their resources discoverable.
2. That they will be able to separate data that is discoverable from that that isn't and provide secure protection for the latter.
3. That they may wish to restrict the community by whom this information is discoverable.
On the basis of the concerns detailed in the IoT-A deliverables, particularly to do with privacy:
4. That it must be possible when required to process the data in order to anonymise it, that is to ensure that data processing cannot reveal confidential data on individuals or organisations from this data.
Also of importance is the manner of operation of such an architectural component. Information mining would lose much of its power if it was necessary for each transaction in the search to be individually negotiated with the data owner. For this reason, the decisions on whether or not to grant access to a search need to be performed automatically which in turn necessitates that the data owner has predetermined the access criteria. The rights management system then becomes a semantic issue, classifying the enquirer into one of the permitted classes, and making decisions on which rights to grant and whether there needs to be any remuneration.
We foresee the operation of the rights management layer as follows:
A. Benefit
In the field of open source software and 'creative commons' media, there is frequently a layered model of access rights. That is, free access is offered to some classes of user (very often non-commercial), with different terms, including payment, required for commercial use. We would envisage that the IoT-RM solution for IoT data would need to follow a similar layered approach, most probably and most easily based on some standardised licence models similar to the 'Creative Commons' licences. In the case for which remuneration was required, there would need to be a mechanism for funds transfer built into the search mechanism. We could also speculate that, similar to the wider Internet, there may be alternative models for 'monetisation', including advertising and affiliation.
B. Security of undiscoverable data.
As discussed above, security remains a prime concern for thing owners, however speculative the security threats. In a scenario where access decisions concerning all or some of the data are being made automatically, there needs to be confidence that the data and systems to which access is not being granted remain secure. Given that much of the security measures proposed involve encryption of some kind, we could suggest that the solution to this problem might be selective or layered encryption, that is, that the data be encrypted in a layered manner (also known as multiple encryption) with different keys associated with different kinds of access permission. This is an approach already used in automatic image rights management [16] and is core to the 'Onion Router' [17] .
C. Identifying the searcher's community
The question of identifying searchers to whom access of all or part of the data should be allowed maybe much more complex than is common in simple media rights management. For example, many sensor webs will fall into protected categories under various states security legislation, such as the USA's National Security Laws [18] . Generally the legal principle is that users of the data must request and be authorised in advance, but it is in the nature of automated web searches that there is no 'in advance' so far as the human operator is concerned. Thus, it must be possible for the identity and authority of the searcher to be determined reliably and quickly within the context of an automatic protocol. It can be imagined that national security agencies would demand a high degree of reliability from such a service, and this this would seem to be an area requiring ongoing research.
D. Anonymisation
The requirement for anonymisation really stems from the requirement to respect privacy. Often, it is proposed that AIDC data will constitute a direct privacy threat, though in truth it is only that AIDC data which directly identifies individuals that does so. More problematic is the possibility of inferred identity, relating from data fusion across different data sets, which might come from different data owners. The problem with ruling out access to some types of data on the basis of privacy is that this also negates some of the power of web information mining. For example, it is not hard to see than some very large and detailed epidemiological studies could be made by web searches of such things as environmental and pollution sensing networks and fusion of that data with health records. If too simplistic a model of privacy protection is taken than such studies would become difficult or impossible. Therefore, we suggest that necessary research should begin to develop a layered model for privacy protection of individuals that will allow the release of information, properly anonymised, to allow this type of search. The model would need to take into account the possibility of inferred identity as well as direct revelation of identity.
V. IDENTIFYING THE SEARCHER'S COMMUNITY
Protocols concerned with the Internet of Things need to be relatively lightweight, due to the use of generally small devices for many of the 'things'. On the other hand it is rarely the case that they are connected directly to the internet. That connection will be through some kind of gateway, which is liable to have considerable resources available. Even the most basic internet gateway devices will have some megabytes of storage available and will use operating systems such as Linux. Therefore, we believe that it is reasonable to expect such gateways to be able to participate in some reasonably rich interactions as part of the protocols necessary for rights management.
On the other hand, we do not want the access of each dataset to be loaded with a large authentication transaction. One of the reasons for putting into place a rights management layer is to allow the fast and efficient assembly of corpora of 'big data'. Thus, it should not be necessary to enter into a prior negotiation in order to access data, it should be a case of present credentials, and if acceptable to the data owner, be delivered the data, preferably in a single transaction.
For this reason it is proposed that the credentials be allocated according to membership of a 'community'. For this to work, membership of that community would need to signify possession of attributes which were those required by the data owner in order to be allowed access. One of the reasons for choosing this 'community' approach is that it is very difficult in advance to know which attributes a data owner might wish to use to allow or disallow access to the data. Communities allow a group of attribute descriptors to be associated with a group of data users, in a manner that is openly extensible.
In addition to being extensible, the community concept brings a number of other advantages. Firstly, communities may be arranged using distributed self-governance -they do not need a centralized authority, instead the can be ad-hoc arrangements of individuals and organisations sharing common objectives and values. In many cases, organisationsprofessional and ethical societies and the like -exist, which could take on such tasks. The problem for the data owner, is whether credentials given by an ad-hoc organization would be trustworthy. For this purpose, it is proposed to make use of the trust relationship algorithms developed by Yalaholm, Klein and Beth [19] . This allows for the trustworthiness of an entity (in this case a 'community') to be established on the basis of the communities that trust it. Thus, at the top of the trust hierarchy are highly trusted communities such as professional associations, governmental organizations and the like, and other communities drive trust from them.
The second advantage brought by the use of communities is one of offering some kind of remuneration or payback for the use of the data, if that was required. Communities could exist which held credit for potential data users, which could be paid to the data provider in return for provision of the data. The credit could be in the form of money or it could be an exchange of services. For instance, providing data could build up credit, which in turn could be used to access other data. Another possibility is that advertising could be used to promote these transactions, as it is for other parts of the web. It is quite likely that the data provider would have some connection of interest with the users of the data, so the credit gained could be used to pay for advertising of products and services to that community.
Communities are responsible not only for identifying the data user's trustworthiness, but also the attributes of that user. For instance, a data provider may only be willing to provide data to a non-profit, non-governmental organization who has already made undertakings not to use the data for specific purposes. These attributes would be verified on the basis of the membership of a community. To do this, it will be necessary to have a hierarchy of communities. As an example, one can imagine a situation in which a researcher belongs to a subject based research organization. Within that organization she would belong to a sub-community of people engaged in ethical and non-profit research. She would also belong to a subcommunity that had offered reciprocal rights for data.
VI. AN EXAMPLE TRANSACTION
There follows an outline of a possible transaction, based on the used of communities to mediate access to IoT data.
Step 1: A data owner decides to make data available on the Internet. On the server for that data (usually the connection point of the system to the wider Internet) is installed an agent to control access to the data. The agent is set up with a configuration file detailing the types of user to whom the data should be released, the purposes for which it should be released, any remuneration or other terms and any anonymisation requirements.
Step 2: A data user finds and registers with a community appropriate to the type of research that they are undertaking. The community undertakes necessary authentication checks (that the user is who they say they are, has the required status and clearances to do what is proposed and has entered into any required undertakings about use of the dada, payment, etc.
Step 3: Prior to undertaking an Internet search (which may involve querying many data providers) the data user requests from the community an encryption key. The key will have a limited lifetime and be specific to this group of transactions, in order to prevent hacks of the system involving collection of keys. Within the request for the key, the user sends the community a transaction key, which will be used to avoid spoofing attacks.
Step 4: The data user undertakes their web-search. The requests sent out consist of their own transaction key, an identification of the community validating the transaction (identified by URL) and the query itself, which might use any appropriate search language, SQL, and AML language, etc. The query is encrypted using the key provided by the community.
Step 5: On receiving such a query, the data owner's server authenticates the query by contacting the community server, using the given URL. First it must evaluate the trustworthiness of the community server. In the first instance, it does this using the Yahalom, Klein and Beth algorithm. It will most likely keep a cache of trusted communities, which would in any case need to be seeded with the identities of communities at the top of the trust hierarchy. The authentication request includes the querying URL, the transaction key and a list of conditions for access to the data.
Step 6: On receiving an authentication request, the community server establishes whether the data user can satisfy the data conditions and has made the necessary undertakings to do so. If so, and the transaction key matches the key provided by the data user the community server transmits back to the data owner's server an authorisation, along with the encryption key that it provided to the data user.
Step 7: The data owner's server uses the provided key to decrypt the query. It actions the query, encrypts the result using the same key and transmits it back to the data user.
This protocol adds two additional stages to the serving of a data query, the establishment of the trustworthiness of the community server and the authentication of the data user. It is likely that in operational use, this extra load would be reduced. The trustworthiness of frequently used community servers would be well enough established for their status to be cached. Further, in many cases, a single authentication cycle will cover a number of individual queries.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have argued the need for IoT architectures to include a layer of automatic rights management implemented as IoT-RM and that the full potential of the Internet of Things, as envisaged by Ashton and other, will not be fulfilled without this. We have also found that the need for this component has not featured in previous studies of IoT architectures or proposals for them, including that from the IoT-A project, Framework 7's major effort at IoT model normalisation. We have presented the outline of a suitable transaction protocol, based on data users' membership of trusted communities. By the general adoption of this kind of rights management system, including the facility for remuneration if required many more data owners within the internet of things could be persuaded to make their data available.
